I was introduced to the Ontological argument last fall. However, while trying to just keep my head above water while in my first semester of seminary, I did not spend too much time trying to understand it (please don't disown me, my dear professors).
Now taking advanced apologetics, the Ontological argument has reared its face once again. I confess that my initial thought was that it simply reduced to: "If God exists, he exists." Profound, I know. I shall pen my thoughts on the subject in this forum as opposed to writing an academic paper. Although, based on my previous syllabus reading skills, I might come to find out that I actually am required to write this paper, in which case I would gladly appreciate your comments.
The Ontological argument takes a variety of forms, but basically reduces to
1) We can conceive of a greatest possible being (please don't try to tell me that we cannot, because I am conceiving of one right now).
2) It is greater to exist in reality than to merely exist in understanding.
3) A greatest possible being therefore necessarily exists in reality.
4) Therefore, a greatest possible being exists.
This argument was put forth by Anselm in the 11th century, and has been scrutinized by contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantiga, among others. After taking apart, rewording, and expanding (to 33 premises) Anselm's argument, Plantiga advises that though the argument is sound, it does not serve as a proof for the existence of God. "It establish not the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability."
Don't worry. After reflection on both, I no longer think this argument is simple enough to reduce to the tautology "if God exists, he exists." I would therefore begin by placing myself in Plantiga's camp by accepting that this argument is sound but questioning if is serves as explicit proof for the existence God. It does make me think, though, how one would respond to this argument if they did not accept it as sound. And, if they did accept it as sound, but not true, then one (or more) or the premises must be false. However, this modus ponens argument is logical and consisting of true premises. What then do we do with it?
2 comments:
Please correct me if I'm mistaken, but it seems no one has been able to show the argument as not being sound. While certainly not proving theism as Plantinga has shown, the argument is crafty and difficult to deny.
As far as I can tell, in order to disagree with the ontological argument, you must simply admit that the argument is sound, but reject that it is true.
I'm not aware of anyone even attempting to show it isn't sound, I agree that I don't think they could.
I agree that then in order to disagree with the whole argument it was have to be rejected as false, but I am curious to see which premise would be rejected. Obviously my 4-premise version of the argument could be scrutinzed, as Plantiga has done, but I wonder if anyone has rejected any of his 33 premises?
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